These are uncertain times. Given how stressful uncertainty can be, maybe there’s some twisted comfort in knowing that Attorney General Tim Griffin’s hypocrisy, noted in these pages since at least as far back as 2011, shows no signs of changing.
Case in point: In a lawsuit to strike the local-control/casino amendment from the November ballot, Griffin takes a position that’s the exact opposite of an argument he makes in a lawsuit over the Arkansas Abortion Amendment.
For the full story of the abortion amendment and the group behind it, Arkansans for Limited Government (AFLG), see our feature story in this month’s Arkansas Times. The brief version is this: On July 5, organizers turned in a petition to Secretary of State John Thurston’s office with signatures from more than 102,000 Arkansans. They needed 90,704 to qualify their measure for the November ballot. But Thurston rejected the petition days later, saying the group had failed to include a signed statement related to paid canvassers. Though most of the group’s signatures (about 88,000) were gathered by volunteers, some were collected by paid canvassers.
AFLG maintains that it complied with the law. The group sued, and the case is now being briefed before the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Among the legal issues in that case, Cowles v. Thurston, is the question of exactly what is required under Ark. Code Ann. 7-9-111(f)(2)(B). That statute requires the sponsor of a proposed constitutional amendment to submit a signed statement attesting that any paid canvassers received a copy of the secretary of state’s official handbook and were properly trained. AFLG says that it did turn in such a statement on June 27, days before the July 5 deadline. Griffin’s office, which is representing Thurston, says the statement doesn’t count, in part because it was signed by Allison Clark, who works for a company that contracted with AFLG to hire, train and manage canvassers.
In his opening brief in the abortion amendment case, Griffin spends four pages arguing that the signed statement requirement cannot be delegated to someone working for or on behalf of the paid canvassers:
The core feature of the statement required by Section 111(f)(2)(B) is that it be “signed by the sponsor.” That’s true because the sponsor is the one charged with providing each paid canvasser with an explanation of Arkansas law and a copy of the Secretary’s handbook prior to the canvasser collecting signatures; the sponsor collects and maintains each canvasser’s individual statement testifying to compliance; and the sponsor statement is the only complete document submitted that attests to everyone’s compliance with Section 601(d)(4)-(5). Indeed, that requirement reflects the fact that it is the sponsor that has both the legal obligation to ensure compliance with the underlying requirements and the unique knowledge required to attest that those requirements were, in fact, met. And ultimately, that is why Section 111(f)(2)(B) singles out “the sponsor”—among the many categories of persons and organizations involved in the initiative process—as the one who must sign this statement.
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These provisions and requirements would make little sense if paid canvassers could sign sponsor statements, and that’s not how this Court reads statutes. Indeed, having canvassers—like happened here—submit statements on behalf of the sponsor would defeat the whole purpose of requiring a separate sponsor’s statement, and the Court should reject AFLG’s suggestion to the contrary.
Meanwhile, a lawsuit has been filed seeking to disqualify a proposed amendment that would let locals decide whether to allow new casinos in their counties. The plaintiffs in that suit, McGill v. Thurston, are challenging the secretary of state’s certification of the local control proposal, and they make an assertion that matches the one Griffin makes in the abortion amendment case:
45. A canvassing company and its employees cannot certify on behalf of a sponsor, especially not regarding paid canvassers. The General Assembly assigned that duty specifically to the sponsor and no one else. The statute does not provide any authority for the sponsor to delegate this responsibility to another person or entity.
Griffin (who is again representing Thurston) answered this lawsuit on Aug. 5, barely three days after he filed his brief in the abortion rights case. But he seemingly reversed course on who can sign as a sponsor:
45. Paragraph 45 consists of legal conclusions that do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 45.
The state attorney general has agreed in the past that questions over what constitutes a “sponsor” are not reason enough to reject a petition. Arkansans for Limited Government mentioned the inconsistencies in an Aug. 2 brief:
The Secretary cannot reject petition parts or signatures for noncompliance with § 7-9-111(f)(2) because § 7-9-126 provides the exclusive list of reasons for not counting petition parts or signatures. The Secretary’s office has at least twice represented to this Court its agreement with this interpretation of § 7-9-111(f)(2) and § 7-9-126. See Respondent’s Brief and Supplemental Addendum at Arg. 6-7, Benca v. Martin, No. CV-16-785 (Ark. Oct. 12, 2016) (“Benca Brief”); Respondent’s Brief and Supplemental Addendum at Arg. 12-13, Ross v. Martin, No. CV-16-776 (Ark. Oct. 12, 2016) (“Ross Brief”). The Attorney General also endorsed this reading. Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 51 (2024) (“By statute, the Secretary of State is only authorized not to count signatures for specific reasons . . . .”). Despite requesting the Attorney General’s opinion, see id., the Secretary has decided to ignore it to reject petitioners’ submission.
Griffin’s office did not respond to a request for comment.